University of Baltimore Journal of Land and
Development
Volume 4
Issue 1 Fall 2014

Article 2

2014

Taking on Water: Local Government, Eminent
Domain, and the Foreclosure Crisis
Brian Cullin
City of Philadelphia

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjld
Part of the Land Use Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Property Law and
Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
Cullin, Brian (2014) "Taking on Water: Local Government, Eminent Domain, and the Foreclosure Crisis," University of Baltimore
Journal of Land and Development: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjld/vol4/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law.
For more information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

ARTICLES

TAKING ON WATER: LOCAL GOVERNMENT, EMINENT
DOMAIN, AND THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
Brian Cullin
Introduction
The 2008 Financial Crisis and the ensuing Great Recession sent
shockwaves throughout the U.S. and global economy, wreaking havoc
from Wall Street to Main Street. The Crisis harkened economic contraction, high unemployment, and elevated rates of home foreclosure.
While the financial industry recovered, spelling an end to one crisis,
another continues - the Foreclosure Crisis. The rate of home foreclosure, already ominously on the rise before 2008 and growing in intensity and breadth in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, provides the
foundation for this paper. This article examines an innovative publicprivate partnership between a private firm, Mortgage Resolution Partners (MRP), and local governments concerned with the negative side
effects of foreclosure on local communities. The MRP - local government Proposal ("Proposal") is aimed at preventing future home foreclosures. Under the Proposal, local governments will seize distressed
home loans and mortgages from the private trusts currently owning
them. After seizure, the local government will renegotiate new mortgage loans with the homeowners to reduce the amount of principal
owed. While the modern causes of foreclosure are no doubt complex, I the Proposal centers on local government's use of a power predating American Independence - eminent domain.
Part I provides a brief history of the events that precipitated the
increased incidence of foreclosure from 2006 to the present and identifies the forces that continue to fuel it. 2 Part II summarizes the
mechanics of the Proposal and provides a synopsis of the arguments
forwarded by the Proposal's supporters to justify its use over alternative policy options. 3 Part II concludes with a summary of past attempts
to utilize the Proposal and the status of current attempt", as well as a
1. See infra Part 1.
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part Il.a-b.
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brief history of the eminent domain power. 4 Part III analyzes the federal and state constitutional, statutory, and practical obstacles faced by
local government" choosing to adopt the Proposal. 5 Analysis will pay
special attention to the Proposal's propriety in light of federal and
state "public use" and 'Just compensation" requirements for taking
property. Additional legal issues, such as the constitutionality of the
Proposal under the dormant Commerce Clause and the Contracts
Clause, along with thorny jurisdictional matters, are not addressed,
but are worthy of future exploration.

I.

Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis

General consensus identifies the formation of a housing bubble!>
and its subsequent burst, which began in 2006, when home value
growth began to slow and then decline, as contributing to the largest
decline for housing values in American history' and a historical1y high
percentage of home loans seriously delinquent or in foreclosure. 8 The
dramatic decline in home values experienced from 2006 to present
created the high levels of negative home equity9 that largely fueled increasing rates of foreclosure. There is a strong association between negative
home equity and the likelihood of foreclosure, IO as negative home
equity prevents a homeowner from being able to sel1 the home or
refinance to a more affordable mortgage when the current payment
becomes unmanageable.!! The initial foreclosures, during 2006 and
4. See infra Part ILc-d.
5. See infra Part ITT.
6. See Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the
&mlting Credit Crisis: A Non~Te(;hnical Paper, 8 J. Bus. INQUIRY 120, 120-26
(2009). A combination of government policies, such as sustained periods of
low mortgage interest rates and short term interest rates; lender and financial industry practices, such as securitization of mortgages and relaxed lending standards, typified by the explosion of sub-prime lending from the late
1990's to the mid 2000's; and irrational speculation by lenders, borrowers,
regulators, and investors that housing prices would continue to rise, were
the primary causes of a rapid growth in home values, culminating in a bubble which burst in 2006. [d.
7. SeeJeff Cox, u.s. Housing Crisis is Now Worse Than the Great Depression, CNBC
Oun. 11, 2011, 12:04 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/43395857.
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH,
REpORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT CAUSES 01' THE FORECLOSVRI:: CRISIS, vi
(2010).
9. See Neil Bhutta et al., THE DEPTH OF NEGATIVE EQUl1Y AND MORTGAGE DEFAULT DECISIONS, Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2 (2010) (A home
with negative equity is often described as being "underwater." Negative
home equity occurs when a homeovmer owes more money to repay a home
loan than the home's market value. The market value of the home and the
size of the mortgage determine the level of negative equity.).
10. See U.s. D£I,'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., supra note 8, at 16; see also Bhutta,
supra note 9, at 1.
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., supra note 8, at 16.
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2007, were ovenvhelmingly non-prime mortgage loans. 12 This first
wave of foreclosures, along with the oversupply of housing it created,
depressed housing values even further. In a vicious cycle, the lower
housing values created more negative equity for other homeowners.13
The period of macroeconomic weakness and contraction that followed, marked by increasing unemployment, contributed to additional foreclosures of even prime, fixed rate mortgages. 14 These
foreclosures further lead to more negative equity for homeowners and
more foreclosures, which further depressed housing values. 15
II.

The Eminent Domain Proposal

a.

Mechanics of the Prcrposal

The Proposal centers on the use of eminent domain by local governments to seize home loans and mortgages corresponding to "underwater" L6 homes located within their respective jurisdictions. Both
performing and non-performing I 7 underwater loans are suqject to the
Proposa1. 1H Under the Proposal, only underwater home loans currently held in private securitization trusts would be targeted by local
governments. 19 Private investors hold interests in these private securitization trusts and would be the parties to receive eminent domain
compensation. 20 Underwater mortgages held in trusts created by government sponsored entities, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
would not be included in the Proposa1. 21 The distinction stems from
research that identified home loans in private trusts as more toxic and
more likely to end in foreclosure. 22 Additionally, the unique obstacles
12. See id at 8.
13. See id. at 18.
14. See Bhutta, supra note 9, at 3. A major trend in the literature on causes of

home foreclosure is the "double trigger~ theory that negative income
shocks, such as loss of employment, extended sickness, or divorce, when
combined with even low levels of negative home equity, lead to foreclosure.
Id.

15. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DF.V., su/!:a note 8, at 8-9.
16. See Bhutta, supra note 9, at 2 ("underwater is the vernacular phrase to describe a home with negative equity).
17. ST£PHEN M. FROST TH£ BANK ANALYST'S HANDBOOK; MON£Y, RISK, AND CON·
JURING TRICKS 379 (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2004). Non-perlorming loans
are loans for which scheduled repayment is more than 90 days past due.
18. See Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19,
Wells Fargo Bank v. City of Richmond, (N.D. Cal. 2013) No. C 13-03663
eRB, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/162436908/Dcfendants-Opposition-to-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Wells-Fargo-Rank-Nat-I-Ass-nv-City-of-Richmond-No-CV-13-3663-CRB.Aug-22-20 13.
19. See id. at 2.
20. See MOKfCACE RESOLUTION PARTN£RS (2012), available at http://mortgage
resolution.com/fags.
21. See Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, S1~prll
note 18, at ]·2.
22. See id. at 2.
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to renegotiation posed by private trusts and the Proposal's perceived
ability to address these specific obstacles are additional reasons for the
distinction. 23
First, the Proposal advocates for local governments to attempt a voluntary purchase with the current home loan owner. If the local government's offer is rejected, the local government must approve the
use of eminent domain to seize selected home loans and mortgages. 21
Second, the local government will proceed through eminent domain
procedures established under state law to acquire the home loans and
mortgages. MRP will use capital raised from private investors to fund
the local government's condemnation awards. 25 This feature avoids
the use of any local taxpayer dollars. 26 The Proposal calls for compensating the current loan holders at approximately 75 to 80 percent of
the current fair market value of the home. 27 The percentage reflects
what MRP deems a "foreclosure discount," which ref1ects "the market's recognition of the cost in time, money and effort to foreclose on
the homeowner and thereafter to maintain and sell the property."28
Implicidy, the compensation amount reflects an assumption that every
individual home loan in eminent domain proceedings under the Proposal, regardless of how underwater it is, will enter into foreclosure. 29
Following eminent domain proceedings, the local government and
MRP will enter into negotiations with individual homeowners to originate a new home loan and mortgage. The two sides will negotiate with
an eye toward reducing the principal amount owed to approximately
95 percent of the current fair market value of the home, in order to
relieve negative equity and make monthly payments more afforda23. See ROBERT

24.

25.
26.

27.

2S.

29.

HOCKE1T, BREAKlNG THE MORTGAGE DEBT IMPASSE: MUNICIPAL
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS AND PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR LOAN
MODIFICATION, VALUE PRESERVATION, AND LOCAL ECONOMlr. RECOVF.RY 17-24
(2012), available at http://www.lawschool.comell.edu/spotlights/llpload /
Memoran dum-of-Law-and-Finance-21-April-Mllnicipal-Plan.pdf.
See infra notes 39-40, 42 and accompanying text.
See MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 20.
See Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, Exclusive: investors Tout Controversial ~Condemnation" jor Housing Fix, REUTERS (Jun. 8, 2012, 5:36 PM), http:/
/www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/0S/us-mortgages-condemnation-housing-id USBRE85719Z20 120608.
See Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at i, Wells Fargo Bank v.
City of Richmond, (N.D. Cal. 2013) No. C 13-03663 CRB, available at http:/
/www.scribd.com/doc/ 162436676/Plain tiiTs-Motion-for-Prelim i nary-I njunc
tion-Wells-Fargo-Bank-Nat-I-Ass-n-v-City-of-Richmond-No-CV-13-3663-CRBAug-8-2013. See also Carolyn Said, A Rescue for Richmond's Undenvater Mortgages?, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.sfchronic1e.com/bayarca/
article/ A-rescue-for-Richmond-s-unde1water-mortgages-4603273.php#/0;
MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 20.
See MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 20.
See Richard E. Gottlieb & Vivian I. Kim, Eminent Domain: Will Local Governments Attempt to Use This /<"xlraordinary Power 10 Purchase Troubled Residential
Mortgages?, 31 BANKlNG & FIN. SERVICES POL'y REp. 1, 4 (2012).
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ble. ~() The new loan and mortgage will then be resold to new investors,
with the proceeds devoted to repaying the investors who fronted the
eminent domain award, MRP, and the local government. The local
government would extinguish the seized home loan and mortgage.
b.

The Proposal's Advantages: Removing Market Imflediments to Principal
Reduction

Proposal supporters cite attributes of the private mortgage backed
securities market that make the Proposal preferable to other policy
options aimed at reducing and eliminating foreclosure. A first mover
problem in the mortgage loan industry prevents individual mortgage
loan holders from renegotiating and lowering principa1. 31 N:, Professor Robert Hockett explains,
Everyone else's revaluing eliminates debt overhang, [and]
thereby lowers aggregate default risk, and so raises property
prices. That in turn lessens the degree to which any last
mortgage remains underwater - indeed it will probably lift it
above water. Every mortgagee therefore has reason to wish to
be last ... All accordingly wait for the others to act. 32
The Proposal provides the "combined orchestration" that removes the
rational impulse to await others' revaluing first. 33 A second impediment is the structural characteristics of private securitization trusts
that currently hold the home loans and mortgages. The fragmented
ownership of the trusts between thousands of investors presents a coordinated action problem, as there are significant barriers to these
investors locating each other and acting together to modify the loans
in the truSt. 34 Additional barriers to renegotiation include, first, conflicts between investors who sit in different tranches, and thus, have
different incentives regarding the timing of renegotiation, and second, the contractual agreements between trust servicers and investors
that prohibit or greatly limit35 the servieers' ability to modify or sell
loans in a truSt. 36 Proponents argue current federal programs, such as
Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) and Home Affordable
Mortgage Program (HAMP), are not capable of overcoming the aforementioned coordination problems and achieve their limited success
at significant taxpayer expense. 37 In contrast, the Proposal "is de30. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 27; see also Said,
sUJrra note 27.
31. HOCKE1T, sUJrra note 23, at 17.
32. /d.

33. Id.
34. See id. at 18.
35. See id. (citing common requirement of supermajority consent for serviceI' to
sell or renegotiate loans).
36. See id.
37. See id. at 26.
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signed specifically to sidestep all of the unnecessary impediments that
presently block meaningful debt revaluation."38

c.

Current Status of the Proposal

To date, no local government has exercised eminent domain pursuant to the Proposal. Collections of government leaders in prominent
cities, such as, New York, have publicly expressed support for the Proposal.!!!! Several local governments studied the Proposal, only to abandon it. 40 Several are in varying stages of study.41 Two cities,
Richmond, California and Irvington, New Jersey, have advanced furthest by formally adopting the Proposal by a 4-3 and 6-l vote of their
respective councils. 42 In Richmond, however, the Proposal still faces a
substantial obstacle posed by a state law that requires a two-thirds
supennajority of the Council to approve individual exercises of eminent domain. 43 A possible end around the supem1ajority requirement
is to partner with other local governments to implement the Proposal
38. /d. at 28.
39. See Ben Lane, /s Eminent Domain Coming (o New York City?, HOUSING WIRE

40.

41.

42.

43,

Gune 25, 2014), http://www.hollsingwire.com/articles/30447-is-emincntdomain-coming-to-new-york-city (rcporting support of the Proposal by four
New York City council members),
See Alejandro Law, San Bernardino County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES Gan, 24, 2013), http://articles,latimes,com/2013/
jan/24/business/la-fi-mo-eminent-domain-20130124; see also James DeHaven, North Las Vegas Rejects Use of Eminent Domain to &scue Homeowners, LAS
VEGAS REv.], (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.revie~ournaI.com/news/govern
men t/ no rth-las-vegas-rej ects-use-e mine n t-domain-rescuc-homeown e rs;
Mary Ellen Podmolik & John Byrne, Emanuel: Eminent Domain Not 'the Right
Instrument' to Address Underwater Mortgages, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 14, 2012), http:/
/ articles. chicago tribune .com/20 12-08-14/business/ chi-emanuel-eminen tdomain-n ot-th e-righ t·i ns trumen t-to-address-underwater-m ortgages·20 1208
14_1_eminent-domain-underwater-homeowners-mortgages.
See Shaila Dewan, More Cities Consider Using Eminent Domain to Halt Forecl(}sures, N.¥. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/
busi ness/ more-cities-conside r-eminent-domain-to-halt-foreclosures.h tm I?_
r=0 (noting Yonkers, NY; Pomona, CA; Oakland, CA at varying sL.ges of
study), See also Terrence Dopp, Newark Advances Eminent Domain Plan to Slow
Foreclosures, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 5, 2013, 2:59 PM), http://www,bloom
berg.com/news/2013-12-05/newark-advances-eminent-domain-plan-toslow-foreclosures.html; Natalia Sherman, Some Call on City to Axplore Eminent
Domain to Combat Blight, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 25, 2013), http://artides, baltimoresun,com/20 13-11-25 /business/bs-bz-rich mond-mortgage20 131 122_1_eminent-domain-mortgages-undcrwater,
See Robert Rogers, Richmond: Council to Move F01Ward with Plan to Seize Mortgages Through Eminent Domain, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Sept. 10,2013), http:!
/www.contracostatimes.com/wcst-county-times/ci_24066384/hundredsshow-up-at.richmond-council-meeting-speak, See also Eunice Lee, Irvington
Moves a Step Closer to Using Eminent Domain to Fight Foredosures, THE STARLEDGER (Mar, 30,2014), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/20l4/03/irv
ington_movcs_a_slep_c1oser_to_usin~powcr_oCeminen cdomain_to_
stemjoreclosure_cnsis.hunl.
See CAL. ClY. ?Roc. CODE § 1245.240 (2014),
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via a]oint Powers Authority (JPA).44 Only a simple majority of the City
Council is required to enter into a JPA. A supennajority of the ]PA
would be required to condemn any home loan and mortgage using
eminent domain. 45 The Richmond City Council approved a plan to
seek partners for a]PA. 4 () Despite Richmond not having condemned a
single home loan or mortgage to date, private trust servicers brought
suit against Richmond in federal court challenging the legality of the
Proposal. 47 The federal court dismissed the claims as unripe. 48 Trust
servicers subsequently withdrew appeals of the district court ruling,
citing that the seizure of mortgages had not materialized. 4u The outcome of Richmond's 2014 municipal election, which has the potential
to shift the makeup of the city council, will likely determine the nearterm trajectory of the ProposaL 50
d.

History and Nature oj Eminent Domain

Eminent domain is "the power of the sovereign to take property for
public use without the owner's consent."51 The power to take private
property for public use has a long history, dating back as far as the
Romans. 52 The American Colonies exercised a power resembling eminent domain, although not using the name. 53 The power continued
44. See CAL. COV'T CODE § 6502 (2014).
45. See Robert Rogers, Richmond Counsel Modifus Eminent Domain Plan, but Prospects Still in Doubt, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www,contracostatimes.com/ west-coun ty-times/ ci_24 7 42690 / richmond-residen tscouncil-set-grapple-again-eminent-domain (quoting Richmond City Attorney on required superm~ority of jPA to condemn loans).
46. See Richmond City Council Session, Sept. 10, 2013, available at http://www
,ci .richmond.ca.us/ArchiveCenter /ViewFile!Item! 5412.
47. Wells Fargo Bank v. City of Richmond, No, C 13-03663 CRB (N.D, Cal.
2013)
48. See id. (order granting motion to dismiss),
49. See Sam Forgione, lnvestors Withdraw Appeals Against California Eminent Domain Plan, REUTERS (May Hi, 2014, 8:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/anicle!20 14/ 05! 17/ us-morlgages-investing-eminen tdomain-id USBREA4COOA
20140517 (stating that appeal would be "immediately re-fiIed" if Richmond
took steps to further the Proposal).
50. See Nick Timir30s, In California, a Novel Use of Eminent Domain Hits
Headwinds, WALL ST,J, (Sept. 16,2014), http://online,wsj.com!articles/incalifornia-a-novel-use-of-eminent-domain-hits-headwinds-141 0887814. See
also Here is Who's Running in the 2014 Richmond Elections, RAmo FREE RICH·
MONO (Aug, 11,2014), http://www.radiofreerichmond.com/here_is_whu_s
Junning_in_the_20 14Jichmond_elections,
51. 1 JULIUS L. SACKMAN NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11, 1-5 (Matthew
Bender ed., 3d ed, 2014),
52. See id, at § 1.12, 1-14 (noting, however, that "it was not until after the close
of the Middle Ages that the taking of property for public use as a distinct
branch of governmental power began to be discussed").
53. See id. at § 1.22(1), ]-78-1-79 (the system of exercising eminent domain in
the American Colonies was influenced by the English practice of inquest by
jury) ,
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in the early United States, as several original state constitutions recognized and limited the power to take property for public use. 54
The U.S. Constitution addresses the eminent domain power in the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 55 The clause places limitations on the exercise of eminent domain by the federal government,
requiring the exercise be for a "public use" and that 'Just compensation" be paid to the owner of the condemned property.56 The U.S.
Supreme Court incorporated the requirements of the Takings Clause
against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment in the late 19th Century.57 All States currently impose independent limitations on eminent domain via state constitution and statute. 58 The philosophical
underpinnings of the source of the eminent domain power- an inherent power of sovereignty not requiring recognition by constitutional
provision, but pre-existing in an absolute and unlimited form 59 shaped the federal and state provisions addressing eminent domain,
which function as express limitations on the power. no The federal and
state governments possess the power as a function of their sovereign
statuS. 6l Political subdivisions of states, which are not sovereigns, do
not inherently possess the power of eminent domain.f:i2 Political subdivisions can only exercise eminent domain through a delegation of the
power from the state via statute. 63
III.

Legal Issues

The Proposal must satisry both federal and state constitutional and
statutory standards related to eminent domain. The Takings Clause
establishes the minimum requirements to be observed by federal,
state, and local governments in the course of taking private property.
54. See id, at ~ 1.12(2), 1-16.
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nlor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.fl),
56. Id.
57. See Chicago B. & Q.R. CO. v. City of Chicago, 166 U,S. 226, 239 (1897).
58. See SACKMAN, supra note 51, at § 1.3, 1-92.
59. See id, at §1.l4(2), 1-23, L-27.
60. See id. at §1.l4(2), 1-29.
61. See Cnty. of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631,634 (1900) ("The right of
the state to appropriate private property for public use is an element of
sovereignty ... "). See aLw Lore v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 277 Md. 356, 358
(1976) ("[Tlhe power of eminent domain adheres to sovereignty and requires no constitutional authority for its existence.").
62. See City of OakJand v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 838 (Cal. 1982) ("In
contrast to the broad powers of general government ... 'a municipal corporation has no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only
when expressly authorized by law,
63. See generally Boswell v, Prince George's Cnty., 330 A.2d 663, 668 (Md. 1975)
("However, 'when property is to be taken for local public purpose the
power is usually delegated to the municipal corporation or other governmental subdivision of the state. , . such delegation is unquestionably within
the power of the legislature. "'),
I ").
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States are free to adopt more robust protections of property from eminent domain in their respective state constitutions or statutes, and
many states have done SO.64 Therefore, in many instances, satisfying
the federal constitutional standard is only the first hurdle to clear.
In recognition of this reality, different state level requirements will
be explored. State level focus is important given the vast state by state
variation in foreclosure rates,6£; and even large county by county variation within the same state. 66 The localized concentrations of foreclosures make the Proposal especially attractive to a limited universe of
local governments. Special focus will be paid to differential public llse
and compensation requirements present in five states currently facing
the highest rates of home foreclosure - California, Nevada, Illinois,
Florida, and Maryland. fi7
The Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation," limits the exercise of eminent domain by the federal and state
governments by imposing substantive requirements that the taking be
for a "public use," rather than a purely private use, and that the government entity adequately and monetarily compensate the property
owner for the property taken. 68 Before the contours of the federal and
state public use and just compensation requirements are explored, it
is first important to investigate whether the home loans - essenti::tIly
contracts entitling the current holder to repayment - and the mortgage security interests that are seized are even considered "property"
under the Takings Clause.
a.

bminent Domain and Intangible Property: J?edfffal Standard

Intangible property, as well as tangible property, is su~ject to taking
via eminent domain. The U.S. Supreme Court rejects this distinction
64. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S, 469, 489 (2005) ("[N1othing in
our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on ... the
takings power. Indeed, many States already impose 'public use' requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional law. , .").
65. See U.S. DEP'T OF' Hous. & URBAN DEV., supra note 8, at 9-12 (identifying at
one extreme, a group of four states with a foreclosure rate more than
double the national average, and at the other extreme, a group of four
states where the foreclosure rate is at the historic average).
66, See Brad Heath, Most Foreclosures Pack Into a Few Counties, USA TODAY (Mar,
6, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday,com/ money/economy /housing/
2009-03-05-foreclosure_N.hull (stating that more than half of the nalion's
foreclosures in the prior year were located within 35 counties).
67. See Katie Doyle, Tt1J 10 States for Foreclosure in january, BANKRATE (Feb. 21,
2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/real-estate/foreclosures-by-stale/ (including California, ranked tenth in foreclosure rate, be·
cause it is the state where the Proposal has gained the most traction).
68. See U.S, CONST. amend. V,
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for takings purposes. 69 Louisville joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford confirms that mortgage security interests are condemnable under the
Takings Clause. 7o The Court determined, "[i]f the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of property of individual mortgagees
in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort
must be had to proceedings by eminent domain.'>71 The loan contract
obligation itself, separate from the mortgage security interest, will be
treated as intangible property subject to condemnation. Contract
rights are subject to exercises of eminent domain, as "[a] contract is
property, and, like any other property, may be taken under condemnation proceedings for public use."72 The Court has approved the use
eminent domain for other forms of intangible property as well. 7~

b.

Eminent Domain and Intangible Property: State Standards

The five survey states represent the overwhelming stance among the
states permitting seizure of intangible property via eminent domain.
California courts expansively interpret the state government's authority to condemn tangible and intangible property.74 Similarly, the California Supreme Court broadly construes cities' constitutional and
statutory eminent domain authority to encompass intangible property, concluding "the power which is statutorily extended to cities is
not limited to certain types of property."75
69. SeeW. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507,533-34 (1848) ("The distinction
tllUS attempted we regard as a refinement which has no foundation in reason ... A franchise is property, and nothing more; it is incorporeal property, and is so defined").
70. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (193.1) (challenge to the Frazier-Lemke Act, passed during the Great Depression, which
allowed debtor-farm owners to stay bankntptcy proceedings for five years,
during which the debtor retained possession of mortgaged real property if
the debtor paid a reasonable annual rent. The Act also gave debtors the
option at any time before five years to purchase the mortgaged property for
its appraised value, discharging the mortgage and giving the debtor title
and full possession of the property), impliedly OVP.r'r'Uled on other grounds try
Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
71. ld. at 601-02.
72. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 690 (1897).
See also U.S. Trust Co. v. New.Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) ("Contract
rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose
provided that just compensation is paid.").
73. See Offield v. New York, New Haven & Hartford RR, 203 U.S. 372, 376
(1906) (finding shares of stock able Lo be condemned). See also Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,44,48 (1960) (finding materialmen's lien on
unfinished boat hulls seized by federal government to be compensable
property and expressly analogizing to '~ouisville Joinl Stock Co. and seizure of
mortgages).
74. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 837-39 (Cal. 1982).
75. ld. at 838 ("A city may acquire by eminent domain any property necessary
to carry out any of its powers or functions . . . 'Property' includes real
and personal property and any interest therein.") (quoting CAL. GOV'T
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Nevada courts have not directly addressed whether intangible property is condemnable under Nevada's Constitution 76 and eminent domain statutes.?? However, a Nevada Supreme Court decision related
to taking tangible personal property evidences a view that the eminent
domain power is broadly interpreted to encompass all private
property. 78
JIlinois case Iaw79 supports the conclusion that intangible property
is encompassed within "private property" under the State's constitution. flo Maryland case law also points to intangible property being subject to eminent domain. sl Florida case law'-l2 recognizes the
permissibility of taking intangible property pursuant to the State
Consti tu tion. fl3

76.
77.
78.

79.

80.
81.

82.

83.

CODE § 37350.5 (West 2014); CAL. CJV. PROC. CODE § 1235.170 (West
2014» .
See NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
See NEV. REv. STAT. ~ 37.010 (2013). See aLm NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.020
(20] 3).
See ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, 173 P.3d 734, 739 (Nev. 2007)
(sidestepping expressly answering whether t...mgible and intangible may be
subject to a takings claim, but speaking in broad strokes nonetheless, noting "the term 'private property' in Nevada's takings clause is plain on its
face . . . [T]hat provision broadly applies to all types of privately owned
'property .. .''' An alternative construction "would undermine the spirit of
that provision, which ... 'contemplates expansive property rights' and provides the foundation of Nevada's 'rich history of protecting private property
owners against government takings"').
See Horn v. City of Chicago, 87 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ill. 1949) (citing to eminent domain provision of state constitution and concluding "a landowner
may claim compensation for the destruction or disturbance . . . of such
other intangible rights as he enjoys in connection with, and as incidental
lO, the ownership of the land itself.").
See gmerally ILL. CONST. an. I, § 15.
See De Lauder v. Comm'rs, 50 A. 427, 428-29 (Md. 1901) ("[PropertyJ extends to easements and other incorporeal hereditaments, which, though
without tangible or physical existence, may become the subject of private
ownership."). See also Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Nash, 396
A.2d 538,541 (Md. 1979) (condemnation of contract rights must adhCl'e to
strict requirements of eminent domain statute); Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Frankel, 470 A.2d 813, 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
("[AJt one time property was conceived of as tangible. But ... the ...
notion of property ... some tangible and some intangible, began to gain
currency. The ... concept of property for eminent domain purposes ...
addresses itself to every sort of interest the citizen may possess. This concept has long been recognized in Maryland."), vacated on other grounds, 487
A.2d 651 (Md. 1985).
See State v. Basford, 119 So. 3d 478, 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) ("[RJeal
property, tangible property, and intangible property may be the subject of a
takings claim.").
See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
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The requirement that an exercise of eminent domain be for a public use, rather than a private use, is evident in the text of the Takings
Clause. 84 In the absence of a public use justifYing the taking of property, the taking is constitutionally invalid. 85 The Court soundly rejects86 a narrow interpretation of the term "public use," which argues
only government possession of the seized property or the legal right
of the general public to use the froperty qualify as the public uses
permitted by the Takings Clause.1-! Rather, the Court has consistently
construed the term "public use" to encompass the broader concept of
"public purpose."HIl Three cases, Berman v. Parker, Hawaii Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, and Keto v. New London, illustrate the "public purpose" interpretation and the analysis used to determine whether a taking is for a
public use. 8 !)

84. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
85. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) ("A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement;
it ... would thus be void.").
86. See Kdo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479-80 (2005) ("[W]hile
many ... courts in the mid-19th century endorsed 'use by the public' as
the proper definition of public use, that narrow view ... eroded over time.
Not only was the 'use by the public' test difficult to administer ... but ...
impractical given the diverse and ... evolving needs of society... [W] hen
this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States ... it embraced the broader ... interpretation of public use as 'public purpose.' ").
See also Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244 ("The Court long ago rejected any literal
requirement tbat condemned property be put into use for the general public. .. [G]overnment does not itself have to use property to legitimate the
taking ... "); Rindge Co. v. L.A. Cnty., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) ("It is not
essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion ...
directly e~joy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to COIlStitute a public use.").
87. But see Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, j., dissenting) (arguing for a narrow
interpretation of the term "public use" based on definition oT "use" at time
of framing of Takings Clause and concluding, "[t]he most natural reading
of the Clause is that it allows the government to take property only if the
government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the property").
88. Set'Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, [61, ]64 (1896). See
also Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (utilizing the term "pubJic purpose" in Public
Use Clause analysis); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,32 (1954) ("The role
of the judiciary in determining whether [eminent domain] is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one."); Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135,155 (1921) ("[Cited cases] illustrate ... that the use by the public
generally of each ... thing affected cannot be made the test of public interest ... [Cited cases] dispel the notion that what in its immediate aspect may
be only a private transaction may not be raised by its class or charter to a
public affai r. ") .
89. See Kew, 545 U.S. at 469; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229; Berman, 348 U.S. at 26.
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Berman v. Parker focuses on a congressional statute90 that authorized
the use of eminent domain to seize blighted, private real property in
Washington, D.C. as part of a comprehensive redevelopment plan.g]
Congress authorized the use of eminent domain for the prevention,
reduction, and elimination of blighting factors or causes of blight. 92
The statute called for the seized land to be leased or sold to public or
private entities to carry out the redevelopment plan. 93 Commercial
property owners brought suit claiming their real property - which was
not "slum housing" - was being seized not to eliminate "slums" or
"bJight," but rather to develop a balanced, more attractive community,
and this was not a valid public use.!H The owners contended the area
would be redeveloped for private uses, such as privately owned and
occupied housing and commercial space, which violated the public
use requirement. 95
The Court emphasized the deference owed to legislative determinations of the public interest noting "when the legislature ha~ spoken,
the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."90
The Court asserted that the aforementioned deference owed to the
legislature in exercise of its general police power~l7 extended equally
in the context of eminent domain, establishing "[t]his principle admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent domain is
involved."98 The Court characterized eminent domain as just one
mechanism available to a government to execute its expansive polke
power, asserting "once the object" or the end "is within the authority
of [the government unit], the right to realize it through the exercise
of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is
merely the means to the end."9~) The Court articulated a broad conception of the ends for which eminent domain could be utilized - essentially determining that public use is satisfied when eminent domain is
used to exercise a pennissible police power. 100 The Court acknowledged the breadth of permissible public use and the deference owed
to legislative determinations, noting "[i]f those who govern the Dis90. See BITman, 348 U.S. al 31. Although lhe case dealt with a Congressional
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.
99.
100.

statute governing Washington D.C., the Court expressly acknowledged the
applicability of the decision to states and their subdivisions. Jd.
See id. at 28-30.
See id. at 29.
See id. at 30.
ld. at 31.
See id.
Td. at 32.
The police power refers to the authority of the states to adopt kgislation
governing the health, safety, and general welfare of its residents.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
Td. at 33.
See id. at 32 ("Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law
and order-these are some ... examples of the traditional application of the
police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the
power and do not delimit it.").

14 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development

[Vol. 4

trict of Columbia decide [it] should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.~lOl
The Court decisively concluded that it is the exclusive province of
the legislature to determine the particularities of how a permissible
end is achieved and how eminent domain figures in. 102 The property
owners contended the government's decision to rely heavily on private parties to achieve redevelopment would constitute a private taking, as property would effectively be transferred from one private
party to another private party.103 The Court rejected the argument
whole-heartedly, concluding, "the means of executing the project are
for ... Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has
been established."]04 The Court relied on the idea that the legislature
is free to conclude that private parties would more effectively accomplish the public purpose, as opposed to government entities.w,o; The
Court refused to offer any requirement that seized property remain
under government ownership or be open to the public to qualiry as a
valid public use. I O(j
In Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, the Court addressed a Hawaii statute authorizing use of eminent domain to correct distortions in the
residential real estate market caused by concentrated land ownership.107 The MidkijJCourt picked up where the Berman Court left off
with regard to the relationship between state police powers and the
use of eminent domain to carry out those powers. The Court was explicit on the symmetrical relationship between the two, commenting
after a summary of Berman that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is ...
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."lU8 The
Court recognized a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's
judgment of what constitutes a public use, albeit a limited one. 109 The
approach to reviewing the legislature's determination of public use

10l. Id. at 33.
10:l. See id. ("Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by
which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine.").
103. See id.
104. U See also Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529-30 (1894).
105. See id. at 33-34 ("The public end may be as well or better served through an
agency of private enterprise than through a department of government-or
so the Congress might conclude.").
106. See id. at 34 ("We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of
promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.").
107. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (authorizing the state to
seize real estate held by large private landowners via eminent domain and
subsequently resell the land to other private parties in an effort to diversify
land ownership, and thus, mitigate the deleterious effects of concentrated
land ownership).
108. 'd. at 240.
109. See id. at 240-41.
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was marked by deference and rational basis review. 110 The Court
would not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature regarding
what constituted a public use "unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation."lll The Court pointed out that it had never invalidated a compensated taking as violating a public use, so long as the
exercise of eminent domain "is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."Jl2
The Court found that regulating land oligopoly and its consequences was a classic exercise of the police power and a legitimate
purpose.ll~ Further, the legislature's decision to exercise eminent domain as the means to achieve the purpose was rational as "the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if ... the . . . [state] Legislature
rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective."1l4 It was inconsequential to the Court that the statute "may not
be successful in achieving its intended goals."ll5
Midkiff dismissed the argument that a transfer of private property
from one private party to another private party was sufficient grounds
for invalidation. Rather, the Court eschewed the lower court's fixation
on the particular logistics of how eminent domain operated, and instead, refocused the inquiry on the character of the ends the government sought to achieve, asserting, "it is only the taking's purpose, and
not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use
Clause."116 The Court rejected the lower court's black and white, mutually exclusive approach to private use and ownership on one hand
and public purpose on the other, finding that private use of property
subsequent to a taking is not inherently incompatible with a public
purpose and "does not condemn that taking as having only a private
purpose."1l7 A "purely private taking" is invalid under the Takings
Clause, but the Court offered a narrow definition. A taking "executed
for no reason other than to confer a private benefit on a particular
private party"118 would not satisfy public use. The Court refused to
root this invalidity on the character of the parties involved, but rather,
once again, detennined that such a purely private taking would fail
because "it would serve no legitimate purpose of government."lH)
110. See id. at 244 ("[1lf a legislature ... determines there are substantial reasons
for an exercise of the t:.tking power, courts must defer to its delermination
that the taking will serve a public use.").
111. [d. at 241.
112. [d.

113. [d.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Td.
fd.
!d.
fd.
[d.
Id.

at

242.

at 244.
at 24344.
at 245.
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In Keto v. City of New London, property owners challenged the use of
eminent domain by New London to seize non-blighted homes and
land as part of a comprehensive plan to redevelop a section of the
economically depressed city. 120 The land would be devoted to a privately owned hotel and conference center, housing, shopping center,
and office space. 121 The city asserted that economic development, in
the form of new jobs and increased tax revenue, was a valid public
use. L2:!
The Court held that the takings met the public use requirement. In
finding economic development to be a valid public use, the Court relied on the principles of deference to legislative determinations of
what constitutes a public purpose, and to the legislature's choice of
the mechanism to achieve it. 123 The Court noted the symmetry between the scope of both the police power and the valid scope of eminent domain, as seen in Berman and MidkifP 24 The Court echoed the
two cases in regards to the role of private parties and the lack of a
necessary contradiction between a private use and a public purpose.1 25 However, the Court noted possible situations that would
arouse the suspicion of an impermissible private purpose. 12fi
Justice Kennedy's concurrence adds an important layer to Keto. Kennedy focused on the city's subjective intentions and motivations for
the taking in determining whether a public or private use was present.
He asserted that even in the face of the minimal, rational basis standard of review applied by the Court, "transfers intended to confer
benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use
Clause."127 Kennedy surmised that "a dear showing" of such intent is
necessary to invalidate the taking, and that the government should
enjoy the presumption that its actions were reasonable and intended
to serve a public purpose. 12H He cited examples of factors suggesting
the government's intent was not improper including; testimony from
city officials and corporate beneficiaries, review of their communications, evidence corroborating the city's concerns regarding economic
stagnation, competitive bidding for the project, and the unknown
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

127.
128.

See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469 (2005).
See id. at 474.
See id. at 469-70.
See id. at 480 ("Without exception, our cases have defined [public usc]
broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in the field.").
See id. at 482-83.
See id.
See id. at 486-87 (commenting that a "one-to-one transfer. .. executed
outside the confines of a[ ] ... redevelopment plan ... would certainly raise
a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot" but that was not present in this
case) .
Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
Id. at 491.
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identity of several private beneficiaries at the time the city approved
the plan. 12(1
Kelo is most relevant, however, for the opposition it engendered in
several states, Government officials and voters responded by enacting
stronger limitations on eminent domain, including stricter definitions
of public use and limitations on the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment. 13o States with notably high rates of foreclosure, including a subset of the five sample states, were no
exception. 13 ]
d.

The "Public Use" Requirement: State Standards

California public use requirements for a local government taking
hew closely to U.S, Supreme Court precedent. 132 Case law employs
generous language identifying a public use a<;, "a use which concerns
the whole community or promotes the general interest in its relation
to any legitimate object of government."1~3 In City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, the California Supreme Court rooted its analysis of permissible public use in state eminent domain statutes applicable to
local governments. 134 The Court asserted that these laws did not impose any greater restriction on the use of eminent domain than the
federal or state Constitutions. 135 Moreover, deference to local government detenninations of public use is required,nl> Most notably, Oakland Raiders provided elastic boundaries for the valid ends towards
which eminent domain could be used, r~jecting ridged notions of
what constitutes a municipal function,137 The California courts focus
on the purpose to be achieved and not on the mechanics of the eminent domain process or the involvement of private parties.l~~ The
129. See id, at 491-92,
130. See William Yardley, Anger Drives Property Rights Measures, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/us/08domain.html?page
wanted~print&_r=O.

131. See id. (dick on multimedia graphic of the United States on left-hand side
of article) ,
132, See CAL. CONST, art, I, § 19, See aim CAL. GOV'T Com:. § 373.1'')0.5 (2014); CAL,
Crv. PRoe. CODE § 1235.170 (2014).
133, Bauer v. Coty, of Ventura, ::!89 P,2d 1, 6 (1955).
134, See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 69-70 (1982) (citing
C..AL. Gov'r Com: § 3731)0.5 (2014)) (analyzing broad local government authority in the eminent domain context to identify a public use).
135, See id. at 69-72,
136, See id. at 70 ("[TJhe general statutory scheme would appear to afford cities
considerable discretion in identifying and implementing public uses,").
137. See id. at 72 (acknowledging the "evolving nature" of public use, which expands valid eminent domain exercises beyond traditional, limited public
purposes) ,
138. See L & M Prof! Consultants, Inc. v. Ferreira, 146 Cal. App, 3d l038, 1053
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("'Once it is determined that the taking is for a public
purpose, the fact that private persons may receive benefit is not sufficient to
take away from the enterprise the characteristics of a public purpose,"').
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transfer of property from one private party to another private party via
eminent domain is not fatal to a finding of valid public use, so long as
a pubJic purpose is served. 139
Illinois statute provides local governments with the ability to utilize
eminent domain on property "useful, advantageous or desirable for
municipal purposes or public welfare," seemingly a broad grant of
power. 140 The statute establishes specific requirements for situations
in which a taking results in private ownership or control. H1 In such a
situation, the burden lies with the government to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the acquisition is necessary for a public purpose and primarily for the benefit, use, or enjoyment of the public. 142
The finding of necessity, in practice, presents a low bar for local governments to clear. 143 The second requirement - primary benefit, use,
or enjoyment by the public - has been subject to debate in the courts.
In Southwestern Illinois Dev. Auth. 11. Nat'l City Envtl. L.L.c., (SWZDA)
the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a taking by a regional development authority on grounds that it was not for a public use. 144 While
the Court was clear that the transfer of private property from one private party to another via eminent domain was not fatal to finding a
public use,145 the Court employed bold language suggesting approval
of the narrow interpretation 146 of public use so roundly dismissed by
the U.S. Supreme Court. 147 Public benefits alone were not enough to
sustain a taking, as prior case law "expressed ... that 'to constitute a
public use, something more than a mere benefit to the public must
flow from the ... improvement.'''148 The Court also employed more
exacting scrutiny and gave little deference to the Authority's judgment that condemnation would most effectively serve the asserted
139. See id. at 1047 (upholding exercise of eminent domain for a utility easement by private developer to provide sewer and storm drainage services to
private community and finding state statutes were not unconstitutional for
allowing the condemnation of private property for private use).
140. 65 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/11-61-1 (2014).
141. See id.
142. See 735 ILL. COM!'. STAT. 30/5-5-5(c) (2014).
143. See Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Trs. v. Batchelder, 130 N.E.2d 175, 178 (Ill. 1955)
("The word 'necessary,' as used in this connection, is construed to mean
expedient, reasonably convenient, or useful to the public, and does not
mean 'indispensable' or 'an absolute necessity' .... A determination of the
question of necessity is left largely to the corporation or municipality, and
its determination will be rejected only for an abuse of the power.~).
144. Sw. Illinois Dev. AUlh. v. Nat'l City Envtl. L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d I (Ill. 2002)
(The Authority proposed taking land from private land owner so that a
privately owned race track could expand its parking facilities).
145. See id. at 9.
146. See supra note 84.
147. See Sw. Illinois Dro. Auth., 768 N.E.2d at 9 (quoting Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist.,
68 N.E. 522, 524 (1903» ('''[T]he public must be to some extent entitled
to use or enjoy the r,roperty, not as a mere favor or by permission of the
owner, but by right. ").
148. Id. (quoting Gaylord, 68 N.E. at 524).
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purposes.1 49 Recent appellate court decisions, however, have narrowly
interpreted the language employed by the Court.
City of Chicago v. Midland Smelting Co. is one such case. 150 The court
in Midland Smelting interpreted SWZDA narrowly, focusing on the subjective motivations of the condemning authority to benefit private
over public interests as the primary grounds the Illinois Supreme
Court used to invalidate the taking, and dismissing the narrow definition of "public use" as the grounds for the decision. 151 Midland Smelting cited to minois Supreme Court precedent that limited the
restrictive language used in S\-'VlDA.t52 The court pointed to SVVlDA's
rejection of a bright-line rule - used to determine if a taking confers a
purely private benefit - as cutting against a strict requirement that
seized property be open to the public as of right. 153 In total, the cases
point towards a case-by-case evaluation of the actual purposes and
motivations of the condemning authority to determine whether the
taking was executed for the primary benefit of the public or for the
benefit of private interests_
The status of Maryland law is in flux. On March 20, 2014, the Maryland Senate overwhelmingly passed a two year moratorium on local
government condemnations of foreclosed and underwater mortgage
loans. 154 The sponsor of the Senate Bill, Joan Carter Conway, faced a
primary challenge from a supporter of the Proposal, Baltimore City
Councilman Bill Henry.lss The Maryland House of Delegates followed
m~ority determination that garage could have been built on existing land is contrary to record
- building such a garage was economically infeasible).
City of Chicago v. Midland Smelting Co., 896 N.E.2d 364 (ilL App. Ct.
2008). The case involved the exercise of eminent domain to seize private
land which would be subsequently transferred to a private entity for parking purposes as part of an economic redevelopment effort. Id. at 370-7l.
See id. at 388 ("[W]e not believe that the focus of the court's decision ...
was on the ... meamre of the degree to which the public would be entitled
to use the property. Rather, we believe the court's decision focused on the
motives behind the taking and whether the taking was in fact intended to
benefit the public or, rather, to benefit purely private interests. The court
ultimately did not believe that SWJDA's motives ... were consistent with ...
its ... purpose under which it purported to acquire the property.").
See id. at 389 ("The sweeping expressions [in Gaylord], however, have been
restricted to the particular factual situations there involved. Numerous decisions of this court clearly demonstrate that possessory use by the public is
not an indispensable prerequisite to the lawful exercise of the power of
eminent domain.").
See id. at 389-90.
See Bryan P. Sears, Maryland Passes Bill to Limit Eminent Domaln for PrivatI!
Develf1Jment, TI'IE DAILY REe. (Mar. 20, 2014), http://thedailyrecord.com/
2014/03/20/senate-passes-bill-to-limit-eminent-domain-for-privatc-<icvelopment! (reporting the Senate passed the bill, SB 850, by a 43-3 vote).
See Natalie Shennan, Housing Measures Pass General Assembly, BALTIMORE SUN
(Apr. 8, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-04-08/business/balhousing-measures-pass-general-assembly-20 140408_1_underwater-morlgages-m Qrtgage-<ie bt-emin en t-<iomain.

149. But see id. at 25 (Freeman, j., dissenting) (contending
150.

151.

152.

l53.
154.

155.
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suit, and the bill was signed into law by Governor Martin O'Malley.lsfi
Othetwise, Maryland law adopts an expansive concept of public
use. 157 In adhering to a flexible notion of public use, the courts do
not adopt any bright-line test of public use, and caution against doing
SO.158 Public use is generally satisfied if a taking serves a primarily public benefit.159 The transfer of property from one private party to another is not fatal to public use. 160 The courts show a willingness to
scrutinize the actual, subjective motivations and purpose for the taking in order to determine if it is primarily designed to serve a public
benefit. 161
Florida presents an example of a state response to Kelo that narrowed the contours of public use. In 2006, in the direct aftermath of
Keto the Florida Legislature adopted a statute 162 that flatly prohibited
the use of eminent domain to affect the transfer of property between
private persons or entities. 163 Shortly after the statute's passage, the
Legislature proposed a constitutional amendment that was subsequently approved by Florida voters in November of 2006, which
156. See MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 12·10l(d) (2014).
157. See MD. CaNST. art. Ill, § 40.
158. See Prince George's Cnty. v. Collington Crossroads Inc., 339 A.2d 278, 284
(Md. 1975) ("[TJhe courts have had ... difficulty in their efforts to define
'public use.' No satisfactory single clear-cut rule regarding what is a puhlic
use ... has yet been formulated. Moreover, even if it were possible to formulate such a rule, it would probably not be prudent to do so.").
159. See Herzinger v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 98 A.2d 87, 92 (Md.
1953) ("We think the fact that after the taking the property may be put into
private hands does not destroy the public character of the taking insofar as
that taking ma..y accomplish.a proper public benefit."). See also Collington
Crossroads Inc., 339 A.2d at 289 ("Under our cases, projects rea~onably designed to benefit the general public. .. are public uses ..."); Marchant v.
City of Baltimore, 126 A. 884 (1924) (approving redevelopment of Baltimore Harbor even though the improvements would not be made available
to use by public, and noting approvingly that it was a project of public
purpose).
160. See Collington Crossroads inc., 339 A2d at 284 ("This Court has made clear
that 'publiC use' does not mean that in all cases the public must literally or
physically be permitted to use the property taken by eminent domain. Nor
is it neces~~ry that title to the condemned property be in the
government. ).
161. See id. at 287-88 ("[W]here the predominant purpose or effect ofa particular condemnation action has been to benefit private interests ... the taking
is not for a 'public use ... There has been no suggestion in this case that
the purpose of the County's action is to benefit any particular private businesses or persons .... "). See also Van Witson v. Gutman, 29 A. 608,610 (Md.
1894) (invalidating taking of area in alley way for construction of wall by
private citizen and noting "the extinguishment of their interests does not
appear to inure in any way to the public service ... nor to promote any
public interest. .. nor. .. to have any relation to the public convenience or
public welfare").
162. See FIA. STAT. § 73.013(1) (2006).
163. SeeJohn W. Little, State of FWrida, in THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN 106, at
107 (William G. Blake ed., 2012).
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banned the transfer of property between private parties via eminent
domain. 164 The three-fifths vote required by the state legislature to
overcome the prohibition deprives local governments the of unilateral
ability to evade the provision. 1 fi5
Nevada adopted a constitutional amendment in response to Kelo_
Nevada's provision redefines public use to exclude transfers of property between two private parties using eminent domain, reading
"[p)ublic use shall not include the direct or indirect transfer of any
interest in property taken in an eminent domain proceeding from
one private party to another private party."166 Following ratification,
the Legislature revisited its eminent domain statutes and codified a
similar prohibition. 167 Commentators note the breadth of the prohibition encompassed in the statute. 16S

e,

"Public Use" and the Proposal

Supporters of the Proposal cite a plethora of ends the Proposal
seeks to achieve that qualify as valid public uses, Richmond's experience, serves as an instructive representation of local governments' arguments that the taking of underwater home loans and mortgages is
for a public use. Richmond points to the burdens of foreclosure that
fall on the city and its residents, the mitigation of which, via the Proposal, amounts to a public use. Richmond cites threats to the health,
safety, and general welfare posed by foreclosures, principally in the
form of an increased number of vacant homes and the problems resulting from such vacancy. The problems include neighborhood
blight, illegal garbage dumping,l6!J increased crime!70 and the diversion of city resources to address these problems. 171 High forec1osure
164. See FLA, CONST. art. X, § 6(c) (reading in pertinent part "private properly
taken by eminent domain pursuant to a petition to initiate condemnation
, , . may not be conveyed to a natural person or private entity except as
provided by general law passed by a three-fifths vote of the membership of
each house of the Legislature").
165. [d.
166, NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22.
167. See NEV. REV, STAT, § 37,010 (2013) ("[T]he public uses for which private
property may be t.aken by the exercise of eminent domain do nol include
the direct or indirect transfer of any interest in the property to another
private person or entity.").
168, See lIya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kew, 93
MtNN. L. REv. 2100,2125-26 (2009) (noting the new Nevada statute bans all
private-to-private condemnations).
169, See Defendants' OppOsition to Motion for Preliminary Iruunction, supra
note 18, at 14 (in 2010, the city removed 295 tons of trash from private
property, a large percentage carne from vacant homes),
170, Id, (noting police find it necessary to devote more resources to the neighborhoods with high vacancy rates),
17l. /d. (noting fire services find it necessary to devote more resources to the
neighborhoods with high vacancy rates).
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rates have also depressed residential property values across the City.172
This market reality has led to decreased property tax collection and
reductions in city services. 173 The city also asserts that high levels of
vacancy discourage prospective homebuyers from relocating to the
city, which in turn, keeps property values low. Finally, underwater
homes' negative equity erodes broader economic recovery and hurts
the local economy, as it dissuades homeowner consumption.
Even if an undeJWater home does not foreclose, there are additional rationales that support the Proposal as a public use. Lower
levels of homeowner investment, property maintenance, and home
improvements by underwater homeowners, com~ared to homeowners
with positive equity, increase the risk of blight. 1 4 Underwater homes
also cause distortion in the local housing market, stemming from current loan holders' unwillingness to consent to short sales and homeowners' inability to sell homes at current market value. l75 The
inability to sell without a drastic loss also dissuades worker mobility. 1 76
The Proposal complies with the federal public use standard. Berman
and its progeny are clear that courts owe substantial deference tu local
government decisions to exercise its police powers and further the
public interest. Further, eminent domain is merely a mechanism used
to exercise police powers; eminent domain's proper reach extends as
far as a government's legitimate police powers. In Richmond, the city
identifies several public interest<; that fall within the city's legitimate
police power,177 even in its most traditional and narrow sense. Crime
prevention, nuisance prevention, preservation and efficient allocation
of city services and resources, and economic development - to name a
few - are all served by the Proposal and are widely accepted as objects
within the legitimate police power of local governments. Few would
quarrel with the assertion that the aims of the Proposal are legitimate
ends to be pursued by a local government. As such, the ability to use
eminent domain as a mechanism to realize such ends is clear.
Richmond's experience 178 and documentation of l79 the negative
side effects of vacant housing created by foreclosure allows it to easily
clear MidkijJs rational basis review. There are several conceivable public
purposes accomplished by the Proposal and the use of eminent do172. [d. at 13.
173. See id. (noting between 2007 and 2012, the city's property tax revenue declined by more than 14.5%. In 2009, the city had 950 people on staff, but
for the current fiscal year only 786).
174. See MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 20.
175. See HOCKETT, supra note 23, at 47.
176. See MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 20.
177. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
178. See Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Iruunction, supra
note 18, at 13 (noting that approximately 2,000 foreclosures occurred in
city in the past 3 years, or 16% of homeowners with a mortgage).
179. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
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main is a rational means to achieve those purposes. The city's experience and widely available data confirm: (l) negative equity is the
strongest predictor l80 of foreclosure; (2) foreclosure leads to vacant
housing; and (3) vacant housing produces conditions injurious to the
health, safety, and general welfare of the city's residents. The welldocumented connection between negative equity, and the injurious
conditions the city seeks to prevent, qualifies the Proposal as a rational
means to address conditions on the ground, as the Proposal alleviates
the root cause of all the conditions - negative equity.
The involvement of MRP, a private firm intimately engaged in the
mechanics of the Proposal, and private investors who will financially
benefit from the Proposal, presents no hurdle to satisfYing the federal
standard. Berman and Midkiffare clear that once a public use is established, it is the legislature's prerogative to choose its method to execute a program. It is the taking's purpose - not its mechanics - that
must pass scrutiny. The city's decision to utilize a private firm to manage and administer a complex program falls within the city's recognized sphere. un The city's decision to sell the new, renegotiated home
loans and mortgages to private investors, rather than to continue to
hold them and collect payment, reflect'> the city's determination that
private parties possess considerably more resources and expertise to
better carry out the responsibilities incident to ownership of the loans
and mortgages. This is exactly the determination made by Congress in
Berman, which the Court respected.
It is worth noting that three of the reasons offered by Richmond for
adoption of the Proposal, namely blight prevention, mitigation of distortions in the local housing market, and economic development, are
the same three purposes the Court already deemed to be valid public
uses in Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo, respectively.182
The opponents of the Proposal acknowledge as much; they couch
their public use challenges on a narrow argument that the Richmond
Proposal is an elaborate scheme designed to enrich MRP and private
investors. 183 Opponents point to what they deem to be suspect selection criteria for identifying loans to be condemned - criteria they contend favor selection of performing underwater loans not in immediate
danger of foreclosure because these loans will generate the greatest
profit. HI4 The argument is easily dismissed. The selection criteria utilized by local governments and MRP easily meet the test of Midkiff that
ISO. See U.S.

DEP'T OF

Hous. & URBA;"

DEV.,

supra nole 8, at 16.

lSI. MRP's role is no ditferent than, in a prototypical taking, a government rely·
ing on a private construction firm to redevelop a seized piece of private real
property - a practice emp10yed regularly with little protest.
182. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469 (2005); Hawaii Hous. Auth.
tI. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 229 (1984); Berman tI. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26
(1954).
183. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 27, at 9.
184. See id. at ii.
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the condemnation bears a rational relationship to the public use.
Richmond and MRP offer solid rationales for the selection criteria,
noting the need for conformity with certain federal standards to allow
the new, reduced principal loans to be eligible for federal insurance.
Additionally, Richmond and MRP reject that only performing loans
will be selected. 18.'>
Even when measured against the Kelo majority opinion and Justice
Kennedy's concurrence relating to the motivations and intentions of
the local government, it is evident the asserted public benefits are not
merely pre-textual. First, the city is given the presumption of acting
for a public benefit; this must be overcome by a clear showing to the
contrary by the challengers. Second, MRP receives a flat fee for each
condemnation, undercutting opponents' contention that the selection criteria are skewed in favor of the highest profitability. Third, the
Proposal is not the isolated one-ta-one transfer that the Kelo m.yority
believed would rightfully arouse suspicion of an impermissible private
purpose. ISG Instead, like the comprehensive redevelopment plan in
Keto, the Proposal is an integrated plan targeting over 600 mortgages
selected by various criteria - not an isolated, stand-alone transfer of
property from one private party to another.
Finally, the Proposal meets Justice Kennedy's standard. Where the
Proposal falls short, it owes to the unique problem it confronts. Richmond will have little difficulty documenting its awareness of the detrimental effects wrought by foreclosure on the city and producing
evidence that corroborates these effects. Additionally, the identities of
the private beneficiaries of the Proposal (the private investors who will
fund the condemnation awards) were completely unknown at the
time Richmond adopted the Proposal. Much hay could be made at
the lack of competitive bidding to administer the Proposal, as Richmond did not consider bids from other firms besides MRP. While this
fact could suggest a scheme between MRP and Richmond to enrich
MRP, consideration of the circumstances undercuts this argument.
The use of eminent domain as a means to solve the Foreclosure Crisis
is highly innovative. The model was plucked from the realm of legal
theory and pioneered for practical use by MRP. As a result, the universe of potential bidders to administer the Proposal was exceedingly
limited. The circumstances dictate against construing the lack of competitive bidding as evidence of a private purpose to benefit MRP.
State specific barriers present possible hurdles for the Proposal in
key states. The specific mechanics of the Proposal become extremely
important in light of the Florida and Nevada constitutional provisions. 187 Arguably, the Proposal eludes both states' prohibitions, as
the seized home loans and mortgages are held only by the local gov185. See MORI"CAGE RESOLUTiON PARTNER.,..." supra note 20.
186. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 162-65.
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ernment - not by MRP or private investors - until a new loan is negotiated. At that point, the local government extinguishes the old loan. 18S
Commentators argue that the Proposal eludes even Nevada's stricter
prohibition on direct or indirect transfers between private parties because the old loan never actually enters into private hands. 189 Such a
position is flawed because it mischaracterizes what property is actually
being seized. The property seized is an interest in real property (the
mortgage security interest) and the contract rights embodied in the
home loan note - not the pieces of paper they are recorded on. The
sleight of hand attempted by the Proposal relies on the pieces of paper being treated as the seized property. Only under this strained premise would extinguishing the old loan and mortgage, followed by
creation of a new loan and mortgage conveying identical interests and
contract rights connected to the same piece of real property, be anything but a direct transfer of private property.190
To illustrate, the Proposal seizes a privately owned interest in a speci~
lied piece of real property (the mortgage) and privately owned con·
tract rights connected with real property (the home loan). The
Proposal expressly calls for that interest and right to be taken and
extinguished and an identical interest and right (a home loan and mortgage in the same piece of real property) to be conferred on new, private parties. The interest and contract right once held by private party
"A" is now held, albeit on slightly different substantive terms, by private party "B" to the exclusion of private party "A." The interest and
contract right private party "B" now holds owes its very existence to
the exercise of eminent domain over the same interest and right formerly held by private party "A." This lends a practical, common sense
level of connection between loan and mortgage "A" and loan and
mortgage "B." The Proposal effectuates a direct transfer of private
property between two private parties and, as a result, runs afoul of
both the Florida and Nevada Constitutions.

188. See HOCKETT, supra note 23, at 30 (noting if a homeowner and the local
government are unable to renegotiate a seized loan, the local government
would be required by the constitutional provisions to hold the old loan and
receive payment on it and could not resell the old loan into the private
market).
189. See Ngai Pindell, Nevada's Residential R£al &tate Crisis: Local Governments and
the U~e of Eminent Domain to Condemn Certain Mortgage Notes, 13 NEV. LJ. 888,
898 (2013).
190. The use of "identical" is referring to identical in form. It is true that the old
loan and mortgage and the new loan and mortgage differ in their substantive terms, but the interests and rights they represent are identical in
nature.
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'Just Compensation" Requirement: Federal Standard

The Takings Clause commands "nor shall private property be taken
... without just compensation. "HI1 The Court describes just compensation to be "the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property
taken," resulting in "[t]he owner ... be[ing] put in as good position
pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken."J92 The primary standard the Court uses to determine just compensation is the fair market value of the taken property.193 Fair market value is "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller."191 The objective standard does not take into account the subjective value an individual owner places in condemned property.195
The Court acknowledges the standard is not perfect. It points out that
even where a market for the property exists, determination of fair
market value will often rely on assumptions that make it unlike1y an
appraisal will reflect market value exactly and will often be determined by "a guess by informed persons.,,196
The Court has dealt with the important question of timing namely, when in the eminent domain process should the fair market
value be ascertained and to what extent past and future events, occurring before and after condemnation, should be considered in determining current fair market value. The Court makes clear "value is to
be ascertained as of the date of taking."JY7 Past value of the property is
inconsequential to determination of the current fair market value, as
"[i] t is the property and not the cost of it that is safeguarded by state
and Federal Constitutions."19H As a result of this stance, "[lair market
value] may be more or less than the owner's investment."199 When
calculating fair market value, it is improper to consider whether the
owner "may have acquired the property for less than its worth or he
may have paid a speculative and exorbitant price" or that "[i]ts value
may have changed substantially while held by him."20o The Court is
concerned with the danger of a windfall coming to the government or
the property owner as a result of past value fluctuations, asserting
"[t]he public may not by any means confiscate the benefits, or be re191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

196.
197.
198.
199.

200.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
See id. at 373-74.
ld. at 374.
See id. at 375. See also United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506,
511 (1979) ("Because of serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth
an individual places on particular property at a given time, we have recognized the need for a relatively objective working rule ... The Court therefore has employed the concept of fair market value to determine the
condemnee's loss.").
Miller, 317 u.s. at 375.
/d. at 374.
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246,255 (1934).
[d.
ld.
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quired to bear the burden, of the owner's bargain."201 In essence, the
Court rejects adding any additional compensation, beyond current
fair market value, in recognition of past value.
Consideration of the potential future value of seized property is
somewhat limited, although not as circumscribed as past value, in determining just compensation. Harkening to the principle that fair
market value is rooted in what a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller, the Court directed "all considerations that fairly might be
brought forward and reasonably be given substantial weight in such
bargaining" should be taken into account. 202 Such future factors properly considered include, for instance, the most profitable, reasonably
probable future use of the property. However, the Court i~ quick to
condemn the use of "speculation" and "conjecture" related to possible
future uses to discern current value. 203 In essence, the Court considers
reasonably probable future uses to be figured into the market price.
The Court does not mandate that possible future value of the property be added in addition to the fair market value. Such a mandate
would run afoul of the general principle that "[w]here ... there is a
market price prevailing at the time and place of the taking, that price
is just compensation ... [m] ore would be unjust to the [government],
and less would deny the owner what he is entitled to."204 The Court
makes clear that" [j] ust compensation includes all elements of value
that inhere in the property, but it does not exceed market value fairly
determined."205 However, to the extent possible future value is reflected in the current fair market value, the Court does not quarrel
with its inclusion in the market value. 2 ()fi The approach of the Court
makes sense, as to a great extent, the current owner is already compensated for future value based on the current market price because
probable future value is generally built into the current market value.
A willing buyer and a willing seller, in most instances, consider the
possible future value of the property during bargaining. To award the
owner any compensation in addition to fair market value, based on
considerations of future value, would overcompensate the property
owner.
While fair market value is the primary and preferred method for
arriving at just compensation, the Court will utilize other methods in
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.

rd. at 257.
See id.
United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343-44 (1923).
Ol~{Jn, 292 U.S. at 255.
See id. at 257 (establishing, in connection with estimates of fair market
value, that "all considerations that fairly might ... reasonably be given substantial weight" in bargaining between a buyer and seller and "all facts af·
fecting the market value" are to be considered).
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certain circumstances.~07 The Court applies other standards when
market value is too difficult to find 208 or when market value would
result in a "manifest injustice" to either the property owner or the
government. 209 In most instances, a market of some kind will exist for
a type of property. Market value is too difficult to find when the property is "so infrequently traded that we cannot predict whether the
prices previously paid ... would be repeated."2IO Market value is still
used even if the market" [is] ... not an extremely active one."21 I The
Court places a high bar on the lack of a market, covering only those
situations "involv[ingJ properties that are seldom, if ever, sold in the
open market."212
Compensation amounting to a "manifest injustice," the second circumstance that makes application of fair market value inappropriate,
is keyed to the "indemnity principle" of just compensation. 213 The indemnity principle is the notion of placing the owner in as good of a
position pecuniarily as he would have been if the property was not
taken. The Court, however, is clear that a perrect indemnity principle
is not required or desirable. 214 An award based on fair market value
"does not necessarily compensate for all values an owner may derive
from his property."215 Illustrative examples of the imperfect indemnity principle are Court decisions refusing to require a condemnation
award in the amount required to obtain replacement property.216
207. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) ("Deviation
from [fair market value] measure ... has been required only 'when market
value has been too difficult to find, or when its application would result in
manifest injustice to owner or public."').
208. See id. at 30 (concluding that there was a robust market for landfill properties and noting that fair market value is not to be used in cases involving
property "that [is] seldom, if ever, sold in the open market").
209. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
210. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 513 (1979) (citing
examples of public facilities, such as roads and sewers).
211. !d. (going on to note that eleven recent sales of summer camps in the vicinity was sufficient market). But see United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402-03 (1949) (determining that five
sales of dissimilar vessels occurring over several years not enough to establish market for Great Lakes car ferry).
212. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 30.
213. See 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 510--11.
214. See id. at 511 (commenting "this principle of indemnity has not been given
its full and literal force" and noting the serious practical difficulties of assessing the worth an indiVidual places in a piece of property). See also
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,374 (1943) (rejecting as too broad the
argument that all elements that go to make up value are to be considered
in determining fair market value and determining that it was improper to
include the effect of recent, nearby condemnations when determining the
value of property laying within the same proposed project site as those
prior condemnations).
215. 564.54 Acres of l~and, 441 U.S. at 51l.
216. See 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 34 (rejecting replacement value as mandated compensation out of fear that property owners would receive a wind-
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While some deviation from the indemnity principle is tolerated, the
Court draws the line between permissible deviation and manifest injustice at the point where the fair market value diverges "substantially"
from the indemnity principle.217 Case law is helpful for illustrative
purposes. In United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, the owner of a summer camp contended that the payment of fair market value was manifestly unjust because that amount made acquiring a replacement
facility impossible, due to a plethora of new regulations that would be
applicable to the replacement facility.2Hl In United Slates v. 50 Acres of
Land, the Court addressed a similar claim made by a municipality after the federal government condemned its garbage facility.219 The
municipality contended that the cost to replace the facility exceeded
the fair market value of the old facility, and it was unjust not to provide replacement cost'> because the municipality was compelled to acquire a new facility to provide an essential service. 220 In both cases, the
Court refused to award replacement costs on the rationale that it provided a windfall to the property owner. 221 The Court determined that
such a windfall ran afoul of the "guiding principle" that the owner
"'must be made whole but is not entitled to more.' "222 Anything properly characterized as a windfall to the property owner is not compensation, which, if denied, leads to manifest injustice. Rather, its award
would go above and beyond the requirements of the imperfect indemnity principal.
The Court has weighed in on the role forward looking calculations
of future value play in determinations of manifest injustice. United
States v. Commodities Tmding Corp. involved the requisitioning of pepper during World War II when price ceilings were in place,z23 The
owners of the pepper contended that the amount of compensation
awar'ded should include an additional "retention value" because pepper, as a non-perishable commodity, could be held until price controls were removed and then sold for a higher cost?24 The owners
contended that as "investors," they should not be deprived of the pe-

217.
218,

219.
220.
221.

222.
223.

224.

fall if they did not obtain substitute hlcilities or substitute facilities were
acquired and then sold. Court extended this dt:lermination to public condemnees who were required to provide replacement facilities).
564,54 Acm of Vmd, 441 US. at 51:1.
See id. at 514,
See 50 Acm' (if Land, 469 U.S. at 26.
See id. at 34.
See id. at :\4-35 (asserting that the increased quality of the new facility, reflected in the higher price, would be enjoyed by the property owner without any additional expenditure for that increased quality), See also 564,54
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 515-16 (commenting that awarding replacement
costs constitutes a windfall because replacement hu:ilitics may never be purchased or may be acqUired and then sold).
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 516 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
See United States v. Commodities Trading- Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950).
See id. at 122-23.
'
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cuniary benefits, which future higher prices would have created in the
absence of the taking.22.~ The Court refused to include any concept of
retention value into the compensation owed and instead determined
that the price ceiling at the time of the taking was the market price
and, thus, just compensation. 226 The Court acknowledged that while
"current market value may sometimes be higher because a buyer anticipates future rises in prices," it was only "exceptional circumstances"
that would 'Justify resort to evidential forecasts of potential future values in order to determine present market value."227 The Court
pointed to the "highly speculative nature" of future prices on which
retention value relied, and the "haphazard ... calculations" required
to arrive at the amount, which were based on, at worst, "guesses," and
at best, many "unknowns."228 Completely contrary to the position that
withholding the retention value was ur~ust, the Court determined
"[a] rule so difficult to apply" actually" leads to ... unjust results" and
is not required for just compensation.229
The Court also addressed the role past value plays in determining
fair market value and manifest injustice. In Olson v. United States, the
Court undercut the position that consideration of past value is necessary to avoid unjust compensation, in the event the seizure occurs after a precipitous drop in value. 230 The Court steadfastly held to the
principle that fair market value at the time of the taking is proper,
even if "[iJt may be more or less than the owner's investment ... or
[the ownerJ paid a speculative and exorbitant price."231 Just as the
public was not entitled to confiscate the benefit.'> of the investment,
the Court conduded the public was not required to carry the burden
of a bad investment. This would place the property owner in a better
financial position, not an equal financial position, and would be beyond the requirements of the indemnity principle.
g.

'Just Compensation:" State Standards

California law mimics the federal standard in all relevant dimensions. California statutes require just compensation be paid to the
property owner. Fair market value, defined as what a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller, is the default standard of compensation. 232
Deviation from fair market value is permissible when there is no relevant, comparable market available. Nevada's just compensation requirement is similar. Fair market value is adopted as the primary
225.
225.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id. at 128-29.
See id. at 130.
Id. at 126.
[d. at 126-27.
!d. at 127-28 (emphasis added).
See Olson v. United States, 292 u.S. 246 (1934).
lel. at 255.
See CAL. eN. PROC. Com: § 1263.310 (2014). See also Gu .. CIY.
§ 1263.320(a) (2014).

PROC. CODE
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standard. Factors that a well-informed buyer would use in arriving
upon a price are properly considered in ascertaining fair market
value. 233 Illinois and Maryland law likewise mirror the federal standard in many regards. The standard is fair market value, determined
by what a purchaser willing to buy the property would pay to an Owner
willing to sell in a voluntary sale.~~4 The Maryland Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the close association between the State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution on just compensation issues,
establishing that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court are "practically
direct authority" for the state's just compensation clause. 235
Florida's compensation standard differs in pertinent respects from
the federal standard. The Florida Constitution mandates that "full
compensation" be paid to the property owner. 236 The requirements of
full compensation are interpreted to be broader than the federal requirements for just compensation. 237 Fair market value is the primary
starting point for determining full compensation.~38 However, fair
market value does not include all the requirements of full compensation. 239 Other costs to the property owner are included in the computation of full compensation. The courts adopt a more expansive view
of full compensation's requirement'; by taking a practical approach24o
towards determining what is needed for a property owner to be "made
whole so far as possible and practicable."241 The practical approach is
reflected in decisions incorporating costs such as appraiser fees into
full compensation. 242 Most notably, property owners' reasonable attorney fees and costs are part of full compensation,~43 a requirement that
233. See Tacchino v. State Dep't of Highways, 508 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1973) (deeming the potential income to be derived from subdivision lots to be relevant
to the determination of fair market value, as "sophisticated investors make
decisions on the basis of income capitalization") See also Clark Cnty. v. Alper, 685 P.2d 943, 946 (Nev. 1984) ("Every factor which affects the value of
the property and which would influence a prudent purchaser should be
considered.") .
234. See 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 30/10-5-60 (2014); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROI'.
§ 12-105 (2014).
235. King v. State Road Comm'n, 467 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Md. 1983).
236. FIA. CONST. art. X, § 6, d. (a).
237. See Little, supra note 163, at 109. See also Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v.
Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. 1958).
238. See Dep't of Transp. v. Nalven, 455 So. 2d 301, 307 (Fla. 1984) ("In most
cases it will be necessary and sufficient to full compensation that the award
constitute the fair market value of the property.").
239. See JacksonVille ExpresS1.J.I(LY AUlh., 108 So. 2d at 291 ("Fair market value is
merely a tool to assist us in determining what is full or just compensation,
within the purview of our constitutional requirement.").
240. See id. at 292 ("The theory and spirit of [the full compensation] guarantee
require a practical attempt to make the owner whole.").
241. Jd. (quoting Dade Cnty. V. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602,604 (Fla. 1950}).
242. See Brigham, 47 So. 2C\ at 604.
243. See Little, supra note 163, at Ill.
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was later codified. 244 The statute awards attorney fees according to a
percentage of the benefit achieved, which is the difference between
the preliminary offer of compensation by the government and the
court ordered compensation. 24 !,;

h.

'Just ComjJensation" and the Proposal

The Proposal's approach to calculating just compensation is problematic under the federal standard. The Proposal calls for the current
owner of a seized home loan and mortgage to be compensated at 75
to 80 percent of the current fair market value of the corresponding
home. The 20 to 25 percent reduction is described as a "foreclosure
discount." To illustrate, when a home forecloses, the current owner uf
the loan and mortgage will repossess the home and recapture the
value of the home at the time of resale. In doing so, the loan and
mortgage owner will bear the costs of the legal process, marketing to
new buyers, and maintenance, among others, to the tune of an estimated 20 to 25 percent of the current value of the home. For its part,
MRP contends its approach to valuation and compensation relies on
market data for sales of distressed loans and mortgages, and that the
foreclosure discount is a common market practice when reselling
such loans and mortgages. 246 MRP's version of market data analysis,
which leads to a loan and mortgage valuation in every case that equals
the current fair market value of the home minus the foreclosure discount, does not accurately represent market dynamics.
The Proposal's compensation logic is flawed for three principal reasons and, as a result, requires substantial revision. First, it ignores the
mortgage loan's value as an unsecured debt in recourse states. 247 Second, the Proposal's overreliance on the current fair market value of
the home to arrive at the value of the loan and mortgage interest at condemnation is a tactic that presupposes the imminent foreclosure of
any condemned home. The Proposal plays off the general principle
244. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.091 (2014).
245. SeeFL-\. STAT. § 73.092 (2014). ButseeFL-\. STAT. § 73.131(2) (2014) (prop-

erty owner's attorney fees are not covered on appeal if the property owner
appeals and the judgment is affirmed).
246. See MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 20.
247. See Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential Mortgage
Default: Theory and Evidence from us. States 4-5 (Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond), auailahle at https://www.richmondfed.Ol"g/publications/research/working_papers/2009/pdflwp09-10r.pdf. Thiny-eight states are recourse jurisdictions, meaning that when a home is foreclosed, the creditor
is still able to pursue the debtor for the difference between the proceeds of
the horne's resale and the value on the face of the note. The extra value
derived from being able to Sue for the full value of the note is disregarded
when the current fair market value of the home is mechanically applied as
adequate compensation for the value of the mortgage notl!. Non-recourse
states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Minnesota,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington. fd.
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that a mortgage is only as valuable as its collatera1. 248 So, goes the
rea'ioning, if a home is worth $200,000 when condemned, the underlying mortgage interest is also worth $200,000. This is what the holder
of the mortgage would recover in the event of a foreclosure. Such a
tactic disregards the inherent differences in the particular foreclosure
risk presented by different loans and mortgages. 2 -19 The overreliance
on the current fair market value of the home ignores the well-deve1oped, sophisticated secondary mortgage market. The secondary mortgage market more accurately represent'i the true fair market value of
the note and the mortgage by incorporating the disparate risk inherent in different loans and mortgages into the market price.
The Proposal ignores the basic fact that mortgages and borrowers
vary, and that these variations are pertinent when measuring the risk
of foreclosure versus the likelihood of repayment; this risk inl1uences
value. Such risk calculations invariably affect what a willing buyer of a
loan and mortgage would pay on the secondary market. The lower the
risk of foreclosure, the closer a buyer and seller would move towards
the monetary amount on the face of the note - often an inflated
amount emblematic of the bubble years; the higher the risk, the
higher the likelihood of foreclosure is and the closer the buyer and
seller would move towards the fair market value of home, as that is the
value recovered in the case of foreclosure. For instance, common
sense would dictate that a secondary purchaser of a loan and mortgage would pay more, and a seHer would demand more for a performing loan with a 110 percent loan-to-value ratio (LTV ratio)250
corresponding to a home located in a relatively stable local housing
market compared to a non-performing loan with a 170 percent LTV
ratio in a turbulent local housing market, such as California. The former loan is considerably more likely to be paid up to the amount on
the face of the loan note, as compared to the latter loan, which is
considerably more likely to foreclose.
Risk is also assessed according to future projections of housing market dynamics. The LTV ratio is the single biggest predictor of foreclosure, however, inherent in its title is the concept of value - a term that
fluctuates over time. If one subscribes to the position that the housing
market is recovering and housing values will increase in the near future, the l.~O percent LTV ratio of today could be the 130 percent
248. See generaUy RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 8.2 (]997).
249. See Bhutta, supra note 9, at 2, 25 (Study of foreclosure behavior in four
states (Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada) concluded the median
foreclosing homeowner did not foreclose until 162% LTV is reached. In
recourse states, the median foreclosing homeowner did so at 20 to 30 p~r
centage points higher than in non-recourse states.).

250. See Evaluating the Equity in Your Home, BANK OF AMERrCA, hltpS:! /www
.ban kofamerica.com/home-loans/home-equilY / evaluating-home-equity.go
(last visited Mar. 17,2015) (loan to Value Ratio is simply the amount owed
on mortgage loan divided by the current value of the home).
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LTV ratio of two years from now, making the purchase of that loan
today considerably less risky and driving up its value to buyer and
seller.
Risk fluctuates with prqjections of macroeconomic conditions, as
well. It is well documented that for many homeowners, a "trigger
event" (like loss of employment) is often the immediate cause of foreclosure. A buyer and seller who project worsening employment levels
will be likely to assign more risk to the repayment of the loan and
mortgage and, therefore, arrive at a lower price. There are several additional factors that could feasibly enter into detennining the market
price for a particular loan and mortgage.
The Proposal falls short by painting with too broad a brush. Its provision for compensation equaling the current fair market value of the
home reveals its assumption that any condemned mortgage - regardless of its particular characteristics - will imminently foreclose. This
approach accurately values those limited mortgages that would have
foreclosed in the month immediately following condemnation, but
systematically undervalues every other loan and mortgage not in immediate danger of foreclosure. The secondary market for mortgages
is best suited to incorporate all loan and mortgage characteristics and
risks and arrive at an amount that more accurately and fully reflects
the value of a particular mortgage on the date of condemnation.
The third reason the Proposal's compensation approach is flawed,
the use of the foreclosure discount, arouses concerns similar to the
immediately preceding paragraphs. It too applies the presumption of
imminent foreclosure to all condemned loans and mortgages with no
regard for the differing probabilities that foreclosure will occur. VVhile
research suggests that differences in loan characteristics (most principally LTV ratio) shape foreclosure versus non-foreclosure outcomes,
the Proposal assumes a simplified, hyper-rational homeowner who will
strategically defauh and foreclose when the LTV ratio becomes sufliciently negative. Working off the hyper-rational borrower presumption, the application of the foreclosure discount to all underwater
mortgages would make sense. However, homeowner-debtors are not
hyper-rational or hyper-informed, and many will not foreclose, even
when facing high LTV ratios and an actual net benefit by foreclosing. 251 Economically irrational factors, such as large perceived penalties,252 social stigma against foreclosure,253 or unrealistic optimism in
251. See Bhutta, supra note 9, at 3-4, 28 (the study found that sub-prime borrowers paid a substantial premium over the cost of renting to stay in their
homcs, leading the authors to conclude that this ~challengcs traditional
models of hyper-informed borrowers operating in a world without economic friction." The study surmised that "more typical borrowers may be
willing to pay an even larger premium given they havc likely invested more
financially and emotionally in thcir house.").
252. See Brent White, UndetWater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social
Management oj the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 971,972 (2010).
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future equity growth 254 prevent borrowers from foreclosing even
when it is in their best interest to do SO.255 A recent study confirmed
homeowners are not hyper-rational, finding the median LTV ratio for
foreclosures observed in the study to be 162 percent. 256 Therefore,
many homes, although underwater, are more likely not to foreclose
than to ever foreclose and ever saddle the current loan and mortgage
owners with the costs incident to foreclosure. To assess the discount as
a matter of course creates a substantial likelihood that an owner will
be denied compensation that the market would otherwise provide in
recognition that a particular loan is unlikely to ever foreclose.
The Proposal's standard departs from the Court's strong preference
for fair market value as the appropriate measure of just compensation.
The two exceptions to using fair market value - the absence of a market for the property and its use working a "manifest injustice" to either
party are simply not applicable. There is a substantial market for
horne loans and mortgages available. Given the high volume of sales
in the secondary mortgage market, appraisers and expert witnesses
could draw on a substantial amount of market data generated from
recent sales of similarly situated loans and mortgages to arrive at an
accurate estimate of the value the market assigns to a particular condemned loan and mortgage.
Utilizing the secondary mortgage market price as the lodestar
would not work a manifest injustice to either the property owner or
the government. Use of fair market value would not deviate so substantially from the indemnity principle, by greatly overcompensating
or undercompensating the current owners, as to amount to a manifest
injustice. Any argument by the loan and mortgage owners for a premium on top of fair market value will likely be rejected. The substantial investment losses suffered· by the current owners, though
unfortunate, are considerations of past value of the property that are
not to enter the compensation determination.2 57 Requiring the public
to bear the costs and burdens of poor investment decisions by the
trusts and their private investors by compensating above fair market
value would provide, in essence, a bailout, and in practice, a windfall
for these private investors by leaving them in a better position as a
result of the taking. Considering and internalizing the risks of foreclosure into its price, it would be a better position because such an
amount would exceed that which the market has determined is the
probable future payout of the loan. The indemnity principle is de253. See. id. See aL~o Luigi Guiso el al., Moral and Social Corutraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages 8,9 (NaCl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15145, 2009).
254. See Bhutta, supra note g, at 28.
255. See id. at 4, 28.
256. See id. at L
257. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying lext.
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signed to leave the property owner in as good of a position, not a
better position, but for the taking. The market value is more loyal to
the indemnity principle than any approach that pays a premium over
market value based on the past value of the property and the large
investment losses suffered.
Any premium over fair market value based on possible future value
is also improper and is not required to comply with the indemnity
principle. Such a premium is analogous to the "retention value" premium rejected in Commodities Trading Carp. 258 Just like the future market conditions and the "retention value" premium advocated for in
Commodities Trading Corp., which were both prone to speculation and
conjecture, the future conditions of the housing market and the overall economy are uncertain. Both lend themselves to producing haphazard individual forecasts pertaining to the future value of seized
loans and mortgages in excess of the current fair market value. The
process of computing and arriving at such a premium would also be
extremely difficult to apply, as was noted in Commodities Trading Corp.
In contrast, the private market is capable of aggregating the information, calculations, and forecasts of thousands of highly skilled investors to arrive at a market price that more accurately incorporates the
probable future value in its price already. Consistent with the fears
expressed in Commodities, a premium could lead to overcompensation
for some property owners. The overcompensation would arise from
essentially double counting future value, as it is already incorporated
in the market price and then awarded again by a premium. Such overcompensation would run afoul of the indemnity principle by leaving
current property owners better off than if the taking never occurred.
If one accepts MRP's projection that market prices for every condemned loan and mortgage will be the value of the home minus the
foreclosure discount, the use of such market data, if it in fact exists,
would amount to a manifest injustice. This is so because deeply distressed loans would be valued in the same manner as considerably less
distressed loans, Such an outcome would either substantially overvalue highly distressed loans and mortgages by pricing them using
identical assumptions and risk prqjections as loans with considerably
fewer risk factors, or substantially undervalue less distressed loans and
mortgages by using identical assumptions and risk projections as loans
with considerably more risk factors, In either instance, the indemnity
principle is violated in a substantial way. If the market operates in the
manner MRP contends, a different standard of valuation will be
required.
Florida's full compensation requirement poses additional complications for the Proposal's financial viability in the state. Florida law requires that reasonable attorney fees and costs, along with appraiser
258. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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and expert witness fees expended by the property owner, be included
in the amount of compensation. Establishing fair market value using
secondary mortgage market data will likely require sophisticated appraisal and expert witnesses to testifY to value. With the issue of the
appropriate measure of just compensation still very much in flux, substantial differences may arise between the government's preliminary
offer of compensation pursuant to the Proposal and the court ordered compensation utilizing the market data approach. The difference could saddle the governments with hefty obligations to pay legal
fees. The local government would take on these costs for each loan
condemned. The costs would eat into MRP's fee or the returns to the
local government's private investors.
Conclusion
The Proposal faces significant state level difficulties in the realm of
the public use requirement. 2 !19 Two epicenters of the Foreclosure Crisis, Florida and Nevada, constitutionally prohibit the type of property
transfer the Proposal utilizes. 26o State level action to specifically thwart
the Proposal is gaining traction, ominously, in a state like Maryland,
which has a political affiliation one would expect to ideologically identify with the Proposal's raison d'etTe. Looking forward, the battleground
for the Proposal's future on the public use question will likely be state
legislatures across the country. With all eyes on Richmond, it can be
expected more state legislatures will act to redefine public use to exclude seizure of underwater mortgages if Richmond proceeds with the
Proposal and actually seizes loans and mortgages.
The Proposal's approach to the just compensation requirement suffens from many maladies. The just compensation rationale is plagued
by faulty, blanket assumptions regarding the unique risk factors of individualloans, foreclosure behavior, and how the secondary mortgage
market responds to both in valuing loans and mortgages to arrive at
fair market value. The Proposal's approach to just compensation is
based, at best, on overly pessimistic beliefs regarding how the secondary mortgage market values loans and mortgages and, at worst, on an
attempt to systematically undercompensate for any loan and mortgage
not in imminent danger of foreclosure. While local governments are
not required to bailout poor investment decisions by the curn:nt owners of the underwater home loans through the vehicle of just compensation or to provide a premium beyond fair market value, local
governments are responsible for valuing each seized loan and mortgage individually. The secondary mortgage market aggregates the
knowledge and expertise of thousands of u-aders around the world to
259. See supra Part III.d-e.
260. See supra Part IJth.
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arrive at a market price that more accurately reflects the true value of
seized loans and mortgages.
The Proposal's financial viability depends on condemned loans being valued at 75 to 80 percent of the current fair market value of the
home. If the secondary mortgage market does not share a local government's belief that a seized loan will imminently foreclose, and instead, arrives at a higher value, the Proposal ceases to be financially
sustainable, as the return to the private investors and MRP's fee dries
up. Of course, the Proposal can be tweaked to avoid the pitfalls of its
current approach to compensation and still be economically viable.
For instance, a scaled back version that reduces, but may not totally
eliminate, negative equity is an approach that would compensate owners adequately and mitigate future foreclosures. In a cruel twist, the
fate of the Proposal and, thus, the fates of numerous local governments and underwater homeowners, depend on the pricing behavior
of the secondary mortgage market - the same market partially responsible for the current foreclosure plight.

